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Knowlton: The Impact of Erie upon the Federal Rules

TIE IMPACT OF ERIE UPON THE
FEDERAL RULES
Cia~tTs W. KNOWLTON*

Nineteen hundred and thirty-eight was an important vintage
year. First, came the earth-shaking decision of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkin;' second, the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Harry Tompkins had been struck by the door
of a railroad coach while walking along the right-of-way of the
Erie Railroad near Hughestown, Pennsylvania. Only a few
months ago in the Supreme Court, there were further reverberations from that blow. These reverberations were the echoes from
the inevitable collision between the Erie doctrine and the Federal
Rules. It is this collision that is the subject of this discussion.
The collision between Erie and the Federal Rules is more significant than the recurring phenomenon of one legal concept
gradually or hurriedly overriding or eroding another. Accepting
Eie as good law, whether a constitutional doctrine or not, it is
hardly worth the price if the Federal Rules must give way to
different state rules. The adoption of the Federal Rules was, in
this author's opinion, one of the greatest forward steps in American legal history.
In tackling this subject, it is comforting to note that Professor
Wright, in referring to the Rules of Decision Act,2 stated that
"no issue in the whole field of federal jurisprudence has been
more difficult than determining the meaning of this statute."3
One may also take comfort, when attempting to put the cases
together, from the statement made by Mr. Justice Harlan in
April of this year that "it is unquestionably true that up to now
Eie and the cases following it have not succeeded in articulating
a workable doctrine governing choice of law in diversity
actions." 4
It has often been said that the Erie doctrine, and therefore
state law, applies to questions of substance litigated in the federal courts in diversity cases and that federal law and rules
* Boyd, Bruton, Knowlton & Tate, Columbia, South Carolina.

1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1652 (1948).
3. WRIGHT. FEDERAL COURTS 187 (1963). The volume of literature on this
subject is staggering. In addition to Professor Wright's admirable treatise see
62 HARv. L. REV. 1030 (1949) and 77 HARv. L. REV. 1084 (1964).
4. Hanna v. Plumer, 85 Sup. Ct. 1136, 1145 (1965).
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apply to questions of procedure. This distinction becomes more
complex than it initially appears when a mere practicing attorney attempts to draw the line between substance and procedure.
In fact, it has become apparent that the line is not drawn on a
strictly substance vis a vis procedure yardstick.
In 1945, the Supreme Court grafted an important refinement
onto the doctrine of Erie in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 5 The
case involved a diversity suit brought against a trustee under an
indenture securing an issue of notes, and the primary defense
was the bar of the New York statute of limitations. The Supreme
Court held that, in the case of a state-created right, Erie required
the federal court to apply the state statute of limitations despite
the fact that the suit was brought in equity. There can be little
argument with the result of this case. However, the Court went
further to restate the test of the Erie doctrine: Where the application of any state legal rule could determine the outcome of a
litigation, the federal court should apply it as if the case had
been tried in state court. For those who like labels, this is referred to as the "outcome-determinative" test. It was at this
point that the collision with the federal rules began, for as is
well known, many purely procedural rules can affect the outcome
of a litigation.
Those crepe-hanging commentators who predicted from Guaranty Trust the death knell of the federal rules appeared justified
in their conclusions when, on June 20, 1949, three diversity cases
were decided,6 each of which rode roughshod over one of the
federal rules. A few writers went so far as to advocate the repeal
of the rules insofar as they applied to diversity cases.7
One of this trio was Cohen v. BenefioiaZ Indus. Loan Corp.s
In New Jersey, where this stockholder's derivative suit was tried,
there was a state statute requiring the plaintiff, as a pre-requisite for the maintenance of such a suit, to post a bond for costs
including attorneys' fees in the event of his losing the case. Federal Rule 23(b) specifically applies to such suits and requires
that the complaint be verified and that it assert certain facts
5. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
6. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v.
Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
7. Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules,
3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950) ; Gavit, States' Rights and Federal Procedure, 25
IND. L.J. 1 (1949).
8. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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about the shareholder plaintiff and his efforts to obtain relief
from the directors and other shareholders, but does not require
a bond. The Court required the application of the New Jersey
statute, although apparently procedural in nature.
Another case decided the same day was Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & 'Warehouse Co.9 Federal Rule 3 states that an action
is commenced in federal court by filing a complaint with the
court. In Ragan the complaint had been filed before the expiration of the state statute of limitations but personal service was
not accomplished until after the statutory period had run, and
the state statute, as does the South Carolina statute for example,
required personal service of process to toll the running of the
statute of limitations. The Supreme Court held that the action
should have been dismissed and that the state statute was to be
followed despite the language of Federal Rule 3.
The third in this series of cases was Woods v. InterstateRealty
Co.1 There a suit was brought in Mississippi by a Tennessee
corporation for a broker's commission. A Mississippi statute
provided that a foreign corporation failing to domesticate would
not be permitted to bring an action in the courts of that state.
However, Federal Rule 17(b) states that the capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under
which it was organized. The Supreme Court held that the corporation would not be permitted to bring its suit in Mississippi
because of the Mississippi statute.
This represented the high tide of the "outcome-determinative"
test and carried the Guaranty Trust case to its extreme. All these
cases provide topics for considerable argument. For example, the
Oohen case may be attacked on the ground that the bond requirement was not relevant to merits or substance of the case, but
merely to the plaintiff's financial ability to get into court, and
that the state statute, being procedural, should have been ignored. On the other hand, it may be justified, as the majority
of the Supreme Court did last April in Hanna v. Plumer" by
the anti-forum shopping doctrine that the federal court should
not open doors to suits where those doors are closed in the state
courts. It is further justified by Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion which says that the Cohen case is justified by the exist9. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
10. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
11. 85 Sup. Ct. 1136 (1965).
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ence of a strong legislated state policy against strike suits by
minority stockholders.
Some nine years after what is referred to as the triple-play on
the Federal Rules,'12 the rule-drowning high tide appeared to
ebb. In 1958, the Court decided Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Oo-op.,13 a case that arose in South Carolina. Stripped to
its essentials, the plaintiff had brought an action for negligence
for injuries sustained while working on the defendant's power
sub-station. The defense was that the plaintiff was an employee
within the meaning of the South Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act. South Carolina decisions appeared to require that
such a question be decided by the trial judge. However, the Supreme Court said that in a diversity case in federal court this
question should go to the jury.
Taking their cue from the Byrd decision, federal courts of
appeals and district courts became braver in applying a federal
rule, although in conflict with a state rule. For example, in
Zovino v. Waterson,14 the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit permitted the substitution of the plaintiff's administratrix as party plaintiff pursuant to Federal Rule 25 (a) (1),
although this would have been impossible under the practice then
prevailing in the state of New York. In the same circuit in 1960,
the court upheld service of process upon a foreign corporation
in compliance with Federal Rule 4(d) as valid, although it was
doubtful under state law. 15 Florida has a statute making an
injured person's statement inadmissible unless a copy has been
given to him. The Fifth Circuit held such a statement was admissible in federal court.' 6 Rationalization: the policy of the
17
state is to encourage disclosure of such statements.
Before carrying this discussion to the latest chapter as far as
the procedural rules are concerned, a brief comment on rules of
evidence seems appropriate. In this area there are far fewer
landmark decisions. Federal Rule 43 (a) pertains to admissibility
and has a triple test, admitting evidence admissible under the
statutes of the United States, or rules of evidence in federal suits
in equity, or under the rules applied in the state court. It would
12. Merrigan, supra note 7.
13. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).

14. 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959).
15. Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
16. Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).

17. Id. at 413.
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be virtually impossible to find a neat set of rules pertaining to
the admissibility of evidence in federal equity cases, and there
are few federal statutes pertaining to evidence.
Despite the obvious risks of generalizations in the area of
evidence, a few seem justified. The "parol evidence rule" appears
to be universally regarded as one of substance, despite its title,
and is governed by state law.1 8 The matter of burden of proof
also appears to be governed by state law.19 The doctrine of res
20
ipsa loquitur likewise appears to be governed by state law.
However, on the matter of judicial notice, especially as to the
laws of other states, Federal Rule 43(a) apparently applies despite state law. 21 The Supreme Court has clearly said that on
matters of discovery such as compulsory physical examination
the federal rule governs despite state rules to the contrary or
absence of state rules permitting it. 2 2 Professor Wright docu-

ments the logical conclusion that state law governs questions of
privileged testimony because of considerable variance among the
states with fairly strong policies in this regard. 23 Monarch Ins.
Co. v. Spach24 evidently is regarded as holding that Erie does
not require exclusion of evidence otherwise admissible under
Federal Rule 43(a). 2 5
Will a state rule require exclusion of evidence not admitted
specifically under Federal Rule 43(a)? There appears to be a
conflict among the circuits that must wait upon the Supreme
Court for clarity. The Third Circuit reluctantly held that testimony of the surviving party to an auto accident was barred by
a state "dead man statute."' 26 The Fifth Circuit admitted an old
newspaper article concerning a fire, although technically hearsay
under state practice, as necessary and trustworthy and material
27
to the issue to prove that lightning did not cause a tower to fall.

18. See Annot., 141 A.L.R. 1043 (1942); 1A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE

ff 0.313 (2d ed. 1959).
19. E.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939). See also 1A
0.314(2) (2d ed. 1959).
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
20. E.g., Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938). See
also IA MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.315(2) (2d ed. 1959).
21. See 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.316(4) (2d ed. 1959).

22. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
23. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 359-60 (1963).
24, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
25. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTs 359 n.19 (1963).

26. Wright v. Wilson, 154 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1946).
27. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir.

1961).
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The Judicial Conference of the United States is supporting
the adoption of a uniform federal rules of evidence. 28 If we
accept the Erie case as a statement of constitutional law, 29 these
proposals may be vulnerable although the recent case of Hanna
v. PlumerO may be argued in their behalf. However, they are
in a much better position of withstanding a challenge if their
draftsmen avoid policy rules such as parol evidence and privilege
and stick largely to hearsay, relevance, and housekeeping type
rules.
The latest chapter in the impact of the Erie case upon the federal rules is Hanna v. Plumer31 decided in April of 1965 by the
Supreme Court. In a nutshell, the service of process upon the
defendant executor was made in compliance with Federal Rule
4 (d) 1, but not in compliance with the Massachusetts law which
required service in hand. The Supreme Court per Mr. Chief
Justice Warren reversed a dismissal of the case, reminding us
that the "outcome-determinative" test of the Guaranty Trust
case is not necessarily to be taken literally.
Hanna v. Plumer in a way is a landmark case in that it removes some of the fears about the erosion of the federal rules
by the Erie case. It is not actually new law but rather clarifies
and adds better perspective to the present state of the law. It
says simply what should have been said earlier to prevent the
Guaranty Trust case from being carried to a ridiculous extreme.
Even now, stating the test of the Erie-Guaranty Trust-ByrdHanna doctrine in such a fashion that it will not be carried to
ridiculous extremes is a most difficult part of this subject. While
we all pretend to wish for some automatic test, we are probably
better off without it because we are concerned with a complicated
policy which is not easily articulated into a short, snappy label.
We must remember the policy of Erie against forum shopping,
and the support of uniformity within a given state. We must
remember Guaranty Trust that in general the results on the

merits should be the same in a federal court as a state court. The
basic idea is that the character or result of a litigation should
not differ materially because it is brought in federal court. In
28. For an expert discussion of the difficult aspects of this problem see Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV. 275 (1963).
29. Whether Erie is or should be a constitutional doctrine or merely statutory

interpretation has inspired much professional prose. See
COURTS 197 nn.13 & 14 (1963).

WRIGHT, FEDERAL

30. 85 Sup. Ct. 1136 (1965).

31. Ibid.
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the concurring opinion in Hanna v. Plumer,Mr. Justice Harlan
indicates that the water is still muddy and suggests that the
proper line of approach in applying a state or federal rule,
whether substantive or procedural, is to inquire whether the
choice of rule would substantially affect those primary decisions
respecting human conduct which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulation. He states that Erie and the Constitution
require that the state rule prevail in such an event over a conflicting federal rule.
The problems in this area are often greater in theory than in
practice, because one can often justify the results of some of the
apparently conflicting cases. The trouble arises in trying to
fashion a general rule. Many of the previous cases are of dubious value as statements of a rule. In fact, Mr. Justice Harlan
states that the Ragan case is plainly wrong. Cohen, on the other
hand, can be justified as a federal rule yielding to a strong state
policy.
However, it is quite apparent from Byrd and Hanna that the
Federal Rules are here to stay, although there will be further
reverberations where they conflict with a state rule-especially
if it is a rule of poicy rather than arbitrary choice of method.
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